Background and Context
Research Focus
The study examines how competing unions develop cooperation within works councils in the French automotive industry despite electoral rivalry.
Methodology
Case studies conducted across 12 automotive plants owned by PSA and Renault from 2008-2015, involving 46 interviews with union representatives.
Theoretical Framework
The concept of "strategic group identity" is applied to explain how and why competing organizations cooperate when faced with shared threats.
French Union Identities: A Spectrum From Radical to Reformist Unions
- French unions are positioned on a spectrum from radical to reformist based on their central characteristics.
- Radical unions like CGT and SUD focus on class struggle and militancy against management.
- Reformist unions like CFE-CGC, FO, CFTC, and GSEA focus on negotiation and social dialogue.
- Identity differences significantly impact which unions cooperate with each other within works councils.
Two Major Triggers for Inter-Union Cooperation in Works Councils
- Two distinct scenarios trigger competing unions to cooperate within works councils despite electoral rivalry.
- Employer threats like plant closures or pay cuts create common interests that push unions toward cooperation.
- A dominant union rival can motivate other unions to form alliances to counter its influence.
- Both triggers lead to different patterns of cooperation in terms of duration and participating unions.
Identity Compatibility Determines Success and Longevity of Inter-Union Cooperation
- Shared interests alone are insufficient for sustainable cooperation when union identities are incompatible.
- Unions with compatible identities form enduring cooperation even when their immediate interests are satisfied.
- Unions with conflicting identities struggle to maintain cooperation despite facing the same threats.
- The strategic group concept explains why moderate unions (reformist) cooperate frequently with each other.
Cooperation Against Employer Threats: Ad Hoc but Repeating Pattern
- When facing employer threats, moderate unions form temporary, issue-specific cooperation that dissolves once resolved.
- This pattern repeatedly reconvenes with the same complementary partners during subsequent employer threats.
- Radical unions like CGT and SUD typically remain isolated in opposition to employer-led initiatives.
- The cycle creates a strategic awareness among moderate unions about reliable allies for future cooperation.
Long-Term Strategic Cooperation Against Common Union Rivals
- Unions form long-term strategic alliances to counter dominant rivals' influence in works councils.
- These alliances can last for decades when the threat from the common rival remains persistent.
- Cooperation helps allied unions gain key positions (secretary, treasurer) in the works council.
- Identity similarity is crucial - reformist unions ally against CGT, while rarely radical unions ally against moderates.
Contribution and Implications
- The concept of strategic group identity explains when and why competing unions cooperate despite electoral rivalry.
- Shared interests are necessary but insufficient for cooperation; compatible identities are essential for sustainable solidarity.
- Inter-union cooperation is often exclusionary in nature, designed to marginalize unions with conflicting identities.
- Electoral competition for works council positions promotes instrumental, calculative approaches to cooperation rather than moral solidarity.
- Understanding identity compatibility provides insights for developing more effective forms of workplace solidarity and union cooperation.
Data Sources
- Visualization 1 is based on Table 1 showing union identities in the automobile industry.
- Visualization 2 is based on the study's findings about two main triggers for inter-union cooperation.
- Visualization 3 draws from findings on the importance of identity congruence for successful cooperation.
- Visualization 4 is based on the analysis of cooperation patterns at PSA and Renault under employer threats.
- Visualization 5 draws from Tables 2 and 3 showing electoral patterns and findings on strategic voting pacts.





