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Background and Context

Research Focus

The study examines how competing unions develop cooperation within works councils in the French automotive industry despite electoral rivalry.

Methodology

Case studies conducted across 12 automotive plants owned by PSA and Renault from 2008-2015, involving 46 interviews with union representatives.

Theoretical Framework

The concept of "strategic group identity" is applied to explain how and why competing organizations cooperate when faced with shared threats.

French Union Identities: A Spectrum From Radical to Reformist Unions

Radical Unions CGT, SUD Mixed Position CFDT Reformist Unions CFE-CGC, FO, CFTC, GSEA Union Identity Spectrum in the French Automotive Industry
  • French unions are positioned on a spectrum from radical to reformist based on their central characteristics.
  • Radical unions like CGT and SUD focus on class struggle and militancy against management.
  • Reformist unions like CFE-CGC, FO, CFTC, and GSEA focus on negotiation and social dialogue.
  • Identity differences significantly impact which unions cooperate with each other within works councils.

Two Major Triggers for Inter-Union Cooperation in Works Councils

What Triggers Inter-Union Cooperation? Employer Threats • Plant closures • Pay cuts/freezes • Job reductions • Restructuring • Competitiveness agreements Common Union Rival • Dominant single union • Electoral competition • Control of key positions • Works council influence • Decision-making power Stimulate Cooperation
  • Two distinct scenarios trigger competing unions to cooperate within works councils despite electoral rivalry.
  • Employer threats like plant closures or pay cuts create common interests that push unions toward cooperation.
  • A dominant union rival can motivate other unions to form alliances to counter its influence.
  • Both triggers lead to different patterns of cooperation in terms of duration and participating unions.

Identity Compatibility Determines Success and Longevity of Inter-Union Cooperation

Impact of Identity Compatibility on Inter-Union Cooperation Compatible Identities (e.g., CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO, GSEA) • Sustainable cooperation • Repeated collaborations • Strong strategic group • "Responsible" identity forms Incompatible Identities (e.g., CGT with moderates) • Cooperation fails • Short-lived alliances • Weak strategic group • Identity conflicts dominate Despite shared interests
  • Shared interests alone are insufficient for sustainable cooperation when union identities are incompatible.
  • Unions with compatible identities form enduring cooperation even when their immediate interests are satisfied.
  • Unions with conflicting identities struggle to maintain cooperation despite facing the same threats.
  • The strategic group concept explains why moderate unions (reformist) cooperate frequently with each other.

Cooperation Against Employer Threats: Ad Hoc but Repeating Pattern

Pattern of Cooperation Against Employer Threats Moderate Unions CFE-CGC, CFTC, FO, GSEA 1. Employer Threat 2. Form Cooperation 3. Resolve Issue 4. Cooperation Dissolves CGT, SUD (Opposition)
  • When facing employer threats, moderate unions form temporary, issue-specific cooperation that dissolves once resolved.
  • This pattern repeatedly reconvenes with the same complementary partners during subsequent employer threats.
  • Radical unions like CGT and SUD typically remain isolated in opposition to employer-led initiatives.
  • The cycle creates a strategic awareness among moderate unions about reliable allies for future cooperation.

Long-Term Strategic Cooperation Against Common Union Rivals

Long-Term Cooperation to Counter Dominant Union Rivals Plant Works Council Dominant Union (e.g., CGT at Cléon) High representativeness (30-50%) Reformist Alliance FO, CFE-CGC, CFDT Enduring cooperation Radical Alliance CGT, SUD (Batilly) Similar militancy characteristics
  • Unions form long-term strategic alliances to counter dominant rivals' influence in works councils.
  • These alliances can last for decades when the threat from the common rival remains persistent.
  • Cooperation helps allied unions gain key positions (secretary, treasurer) in the works council.
  • Identity similarity is crucial - reformist unions ally against CGT, while rarely radical unions ally against moderates.

Contribution and Implications

  • The concept of strategic group identity explains when and why competing unions cooperate despite electoral rivalry.
  • Shared interests are necessary but insufficient for cooperation; compatible identities are essential for sustainable solidarity.
  • Inter-union cooperation is often exclusionary in nature, designed to marginalize unions with conflicting identities.
  • Electoral competition for works council positions promotes instrumental, calculative approaches to cooperation rather than moral solidarity.
  • Understanding identity compatibility provides insights for developing more effective forms of workplace solidarity and union cooperation.

Data Sources

  • Visualization 1 is based on Table 1 showing union identities in the automobile industry.
  • Visualization 2 is based on the study's findings about two main triggers for inter-union cooperation.
  • Visualization 3 draws from findings on the importance of identity congruence for successful cooperation.
  • Visualization 4 is based on the analysis of cooperation patterns at PSA and Renault under employer threats.
  • Visualization 5 draws from Tables 2 and 3 showing electoral patterns and findings on strategic voting pacts.